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ABSTRACT: While the Academic sceptics followed the plausible as a criterion 
of truth and guided their practice by a doxastic norm, so thinking that agential 
performances are actions for which the agent assumes responsibility, the 
Pyrrhonists did not accept rational belief-management, dispensing with 
judgment in empirical matters. In this sense, the Pyrrhonian Sceptic described 
himself as not acting in any robust sense of the notion, or as ‘acting’ out of sub-
personal and social mechanisms. The important point is that the Pyrrhonian 
advocacy of a minimal conception of ‘belief’ was motivated by ethical concerns: 
avoiding any sort of commitment, he attempted to preserve his peace of mind. 
In this article, I argue for a Cartesian model of rational guidance that, in line 
with some current versions of an agential virtue epistemology, does involve 
judgment and risk, and thus which is true both to our rational constitution and 
to our finite and fallible nature. Insofar as epistemic humility is a virtue of 
rational agents that recognise the limits of their judgments, Pyrrhonian 
scepticism, and a fortiori any variety of naturalism, is unable to accommodate 
this virtue. This means that, in contrast to the Cartesian model, the Pyrrhonist 
does not provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of cognitive 
disintegration. The Pyrrhonist thus becomes a social rebel, one that violates the 
norm of serious personal assent that enables the flourishing of a collaborative 
and social species which depends on agents that, however fallible, are 
accountable for their actions and judgments.  
KEYWORDS: intellectual humility, epistemic agency, Pyrrhonism, René 
Descartes, virtue epistemology  
 
In this paper I argue that, despite regarding openmindedness as the distinctive 
virtue of sceptical enquirers, the Pyrrhonians were unable to provide the proper 
epistemic framework to accommodate such a virtue. On the one hand, their 
investigations were guided by pragmatic motivations such that they remove both 
cognitive competences and openmindedness. On the other hand, they failed to 
ground a relation of strict entailment between a theoretical and a normative 
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scepticism, in such a way that knowledge and rational belief stand or fall together, 
and thus, they failed in the task of dispensing with judgmental beliefs and of 
describing activity as a natural process that does not require of a monitoring 
subject. Curiously, instead of preventing a radical divorce between the subject and 
his actions, the Pyrrhonian cure of passivity severely intensified it. This is why I 
argue for a Cartesian model of rational guidance where the norm of judging to the 
best and the virtue of intellectual humility are logically interrelated, a model that, 
far from applying the norm of certainty to empirical judgments, it conceives 
humility as the proper attitude of human agents that, in order to be true to their 
rational natures, have to judge to the best of their powers, but that, recognizing 
the limited nature of those powers, have to come to terms with the fact that the 
exercise of agency is compatible with failure. 
In section 1, I will introduce an instrumental conception of scepticism, such 
that sceptical arguments are seen as means to clear the mind of preconceptions 
and to achieve a state of mind proper to receiving philosophical clarification, and 
contrast this conception with the Pyrrhonian positive and ethical description of 
scepticism. In section 2, I present what I take to be the strongest case for the 
Pyrrhonian, arguing that the Pyrrhonian distinction between two kinds of assent 
is prima facie able to answer the apraxia challenge, and analysing the Pyrrhonian 
diagnosis of epistemic regret and cognitive disintegration. In section 3, a detailed 
critique is mounted of some fundamental aspects of Pyrrhonism. In section 4, 
intellectual humility is located within a Cartesian framework. Finally, the 
Appendix explores some deep affinities between Descartes’ conception of rational 
agency and Sosa’s view on the same issue. The overarching theses are that no 
variety of naturalism is able to accommodate intellectual humility, and that 
epistemic remorse and cognitive disintegration can only be overcome when action 
is guided by rational considerations, however minimal and impaired by external 
circumstances such as urgency, lack of veridical information or unfriendly 
scenarios. 
1. Freedom from Doubt 
Consider the following remark, which Wittgenstein makes in On Certainty: 
I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again “I know 
that that’s a tree”, pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and 
hears this, and I tell him: “This fellow isn’t insane. We are only doing 
philosophy.”1  
                                                                
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), § 467. 
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This piece of savage comic humour in which philosophy becomes the brunt 
of Wittgenstein’s sarcasm is also (as the use of ‘we’ makes clear) an appalling 
example of self-fustigation that manifests how tormented was Wittgenstein by 
philosophical problems.  
The meaning of this remark is, however, deeper and more general. 
Wittgenstein is not only making fun of himself, but shifting our attention to an 
attitude or habit of mind which is characteristically philosophical, that of 
obstinately asserting platitudes “of such a kind that it is difficult to imagine why 
anyone should believe the contrary,”2 as if by means of mere repetition the 
philosopher would be casting a spell to ward off possibilities which might “plunge 
(them) into chaos.”3 Insofar as the philosopher is “bewitched”4 by those trivialities, 
and that his attitude is at odds with ‘healthy’ common sense, his practice is both 
analogous to the sceptical habit of doubting the indubitable and to the religious 
habit of believing the incredible. For all the three cases, the common target is the 
illness of anxiety, and the common goal, a way of life free from the anxieties of an 
uncertainty that reflection raises and that reflection seems unable to appease.  
One could be tempted to overemphasize Wittgenstein’s gloomiest moments, 
and so to interpret his variety of anti-philosophical philosophy as a way of 
cleansing the philosopher’s habit of mind. On this reading, Wittgenstein’s 
inability to stop doing philosophy5 was nothing else than the personal tragedy of a 
man that sinks beneath a burden that he can neither bear nor cast away.  
This view does not answer, however, to the general impression that we 
receive from at least On Certainty. On the one hand, Wittgenstein steadfastly 
sticks to epistemic platitudes of a certain sort (the so-called ‘hinge-propositions’) 
whose revision “would amount to annihilation of all yardsticks,”6 accusing Moore, 
not of philosophical obsession, but of treating hinges as if they were empirical 
propositions7 that emerge “from some kind of ratiocination.”8 On the other hand, 
self-doubting is a constitutive part of transformative and therapeutical processes 
where the subject explicitly dissociates himself from compulsions and inclinations 
of some kind or another, and where he has to muster all his intellectual and 
volitional resources to prevent relapsing into habitual opinions that keep coming 
                                                                
2 Ibid., § 93. 
3 Ibid., § 613. 
4 Ibid., § 31. 
5 See Rush Rhees, Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Discourse (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 261-
262. 
6 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, § 692. 
7 See Ibid., § 136. 
8 Ibid., § 475. 
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back, capturing his beliefs.9 In this respect, it is not too difficult both to see that, in 
On Certainty, Wittgenstein struggles to resist the natural pull of what Duncan 
Pritchard aptly calls “the universality of rational evaluation,”10 namely, of 
understanding hinges as rationally supported and justified, and so as on the same 
spectrum as empirical propositions, and to appreciate the critical role played by 
sceptical arguments to break this pull and to clear the mind of preconceptions. 
Certainly, by Wittgenstein’s lights, the Sceptic makes the same mistake as Moore. 
But, unlike the latter, his very destructive results disclose the arational status of 
hinges. On a dialectical and parasitical reading of scepticism, the Sceptic, instead 
of sharing Moore’s presuppositions, draws the unwanted conclusions implicit in 
the latter’s assumptions.11 
According to the picture that emerges from the previous remarks the source 
of anxiety is some sort of attitude, normative drive, compulsion or prejudice so 
deeply entrenched in our ordinary nature and in our quotidian practices that its 
cure requires us, by means of externalizing this deep-seated aspect, to direct our 
will in the opposite direction. The Pyrrhonians identified that source as our 
natural tendencies to belief and commitment, inclinations that, making of the 
philosophically untrained a victim of unfounded dogmatism, double his troubles 
and make of him the subject of perturbation. Descartes saw it as a pre-
philosophical state of untutored reason, rash precipitation, opinionated judgment, 
and compulsive passion associated for him with childhood and infirmity. 
Wittgenstein described the source of disquiet as the hold of unconscious pictures 
which, deeply ingrained in our thinking and petrified in our language, function as 
norms of representation and exclude alternative possibilities. Under the thrall of 
those imperative models, the human being of common sense is ripe for 
dogmatism. 
                                                                
9 See René Descartes, “Meditations on First Philosophy,” in The Philosophical Writings of 
Descartes, Volume II, eds. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 15.  
10 Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Angst. Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our 
Believing (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016), 3. 
11 This means that a theoretical scepticism —the view that there are no rational grounds for our 
basic commitments—does not entail a normative scepticism according to which we should not 
assent to those commitments. One could be a theoretical sceptic without recommending 
suspension of assent, either because, offset by our natural inclinations, that recommendation 
would be idle (Hume), or because the doxastic norms governing empirical beliefs do not apply 
to hinges (Wittgenstein), or because, although falling short of strict knowledge, some 
propositions are more likely true than their negations (Academic Sceptics).   
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Notice that on this view philosophical dogmatism is on the spectrum of 
ordinary attitudes, and so that, while on the first order the philosopher of 
common sense (whether of a Moorean or of an Aristotelian streak) acts as the 
spokesman and the organizer of common nature, on the meta-order philosophical 
and common views share epistemological principles as generally hold as deeply 
mistaken. In this sense, the main goal of therapeutical philosophies such as those 
of Descartes and Wittgenstein is to expose and replace those meta-epistemological 
principles that the human being of common sense unreflectively endorses and that 
the philosopher of common sense prematurely reifies.      
Notice too that theoretical scepticism is both the natural offspring of 
common sense’s commitments and an indispensable laxative.  
Insofar as the dogmatic is always concealing a secret doubt, while the 
anxieties that assault his mind are ‘anxieties of uncertainty,’ the Sceptic isolates 
and exacerbates that concealed doubt in order to make it explicit, so as to break 
the hold of downright complacency. Bringing to the open the pervasiveness of 
doubt, the Sceptic aggravates the disquiet. Disclosing that the very core of our 
epistemic practices is poisoned by sceptical paradoxes, he manages to substitute 
philosophical scepticism for philosophical dogmatism at the front and centre of 
common sense, swapping an assertive for a humble attitude. He offers a cure of 
humility that could be easily interpreted as the main way to achieve the state of 
mind proper to receive philosophical (or religious) clarification. The important 
point is, however, that therapeutical philosophies, either of a Cartesian or of a 
Wittgensteinian streak, are grafted on sceptical procedures and conclusions that, 
as in a mirror darkly, reflect the true substance of our entrenched practices. The 
sceptical crisis is thus the precondition of philosophical reconstruction. 
The problem is that, according to this conception, scepticism is hostage to 
the same epistemological views distinctive of common sense, so that, even if 
capable of changing our epistemic attitude, it falls short. It fails to transcend 
embedded opinions regarding the proper sources of certainty and knowledge, 
failing thus to secure intellectual quietude. Instead of a cure for uncertainty, 
sceptical humility would merely be the correct attitude to its ubiquity, or, in the 
words of Sedley, “a modest sacrifice at the altar of intellectual honesty.”12 
Intrinsically constrained to be a method, scepticism is on this view unable to be a 
positive means to, and much less to constitute our freedom. Sceptical humility and 
openmindedness would thus receive its true meaning and significance from the 
                                                                
12 David Sedley, “The Motivation of Greek Skepticism,” in The Skeptical Tradition, ed. Myles 
Burnyeat (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), 10. 
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outside, that is to say, from the potential buildings that could be constructed on 
the debris left by the sceptical flood, having so a very limited intrinsic value. 
The trouble is that there is a mismatch between this instrumental vision of 
scepticism and what the real life Sceptics of the Pyrrhonian tradition said about 
themselves. Pyrrhonian scepticism was governed by an ethical doctrine that 
underlined the intrinsic value of suspension of assent and that consistently 
identified scepticism with the liberated personality, by a sustained effort, 
conditional to that ethical motivation, of breaking the hold of natural inclinations 
and common sense assumptions, and by an unmitigated will to provide for 
sceptical humility (under the name of ‘openmindedness’) a place of honour. There 
is a truth contained in the methodological approach to scepticism: that, given its 
parasitical and negative nature, it is very difficult to make sense of the Pyrrhonian 
positive and ethical claims. However, a charitable reading of Pyrrhonism is 
opportune, if only because of the fact that a disclosure of the limitations of the 
sceptical “persuasion”13 could shed light on the very limits and possibilities of 
therapeutical reconstructions of philosophy, and with it on the proper place of 
humility among the intellectual virtues. 
2. Pyrrhonian Therapy  
On a popular picture of scepticism famously advanced by Hume, the only cure for 
the unmitigated Pyrrhonism that thrives in the solitary confines of meditation is 
the force of nature, against which sceptical arguments are powerless and idle. This 
means that, by Hume’s lights, the suspension of assent so energetically 
recommended by the Pyrrhonists cannot be sustained, and that belief is as natural 
as unavoidable.  
As a charge to scepticism, Hume’s remarks boil down to an updated version 
of the apraxia challenge, which confronts the Sceptic with the task of explaining 
how his doctrine avoids inconsistency and how his principles do not reduce him 
to complete inactivity. In any case, the curious thing about Hume’s view of 
Pyrrhonism is that, as he should perfectly know, it does not fit with the 
Pyrrhonist’s self-description. After all, the Pyrrhonist is eager to appeal to “the 
guidance of nature”14 and to “everyday observances”15 in order to be active, as well 
as to insist that, insofar as his concerns are practical ones, his scepticism is (must 
be) compatible with his ability to act in the world. It seems clear that Hume 
                                                                
13 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, eds. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 17. 
14 Ibid., 23. 
15 Ibid., 23. 
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missed an essential point of ancient scepticism—the Pyrrhonian distinction 
between two kinds of assent or belief—,16 a point that, while marking the strong 
affinities between the Humean and the Pyrrhonian varieties of naturalism, helps 
to clarify why the Pyrrhonist is able to endorse an unmitigated withholding 
without compromising his active life. 
In a strong sense, beliefs are for the Pyrrhonist equivalent to doxastic 
attitudes that involve taking any given proposition as true (or false) to reality, as 
representing (or misrepresenting) how things really are in themselves. Dogmatic 
beliefs are not mechanical dispositions responsive to causal and sub-personal 
processes. Supported by reasons, they exhibit a normative and epistemic character, 
and so they are judgments endorsed by the agent at a reflective level for which he 
is responsible and accountable. Following the Stoic’s model, the Pyrrhonists 
recognized three varieties of judgments: opinions (fallible judgments), cognitions 
(infallible judgments comparable with Descartes’ moral certainties), and 
understandings (infallible judgments mutually and logically related within a 
system of science). Dogmatic beliefs being alethic affirmations that involve the 
endeavour to get it right on whether p on the part of the agent, they amount to 
what Sosa calls “judgmental beliefs.”17 Unlike what happens with the second (and 
minimal) notion of belief analysed by the Pyrrhonians, judgmental beliefs are 
under the (indirect) control of the subject, being in our power to break their hold 
and to bring them to suspension. It goes without saying that judgmental beliefs are 
the target of the Pyrrhonian therapy, and so that they have to be eradicated in 
order to overcome epistemic disturbance. In this sense, there is no difference 
between probable opinions and akataleptic (apprehensive) impressions: liberation 
means for the Sceptic liberation from any sort of judgment and commitment, 
whether weak or strong. Notice, moreover, that the combined facts that 
judgmental beliefs are (i) (indirectly) voluntary, (ii) that they are responsive to 
reasons, and (iii) that they do not exhaust the scope of belief, help to explain how 
suspension of assent can be sustained, becoming so a permanent frame of mind for 
the Sceptic: again and again the Pyrrhonist appeals to counterpoising arguments in 
order to avoid relapsing into dogmatic attitudes, in such a way that the sceptical 
dialectical gymnastics is comparable with the Wittgensteinian procedure of 
assembling reminders.     
In contrast to judgmental beliefs, approvals are assents “in accordance with 
a passive appearance,”18 beliefs in the limiting sense of forced and undogmatic 
                                                                
16 See Ibid., 13. 
17 Ernest Sosa, Judgment and Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 52. 
18 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines, 19. 
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natural beliefs. Forced, because it is not in our power to suspend those 
psychological inclinations. Undogmatic, because, instead of dealing with how 
things really are, they deal with how they appear to be, released of any sort of 
alethic emphasis. Natural, insofar as they are non-reflective and spontaneous 
compulsions that make it possible for the Sceptic to go “through the motions of 
ordinary life.”19 The important points to note are that, for the Pyrrhonist, it makes 
no sense to get rid of those compulsive drives; that, since they are not a guide to 
truth, and the only role they play is a functional and sub-personal role in the 
welfare of the individual, approvals are understood on the model of sensations; 
and that, in order to avoid the charge of inconsistency, the Pyrrhonian provides a 
complete reconstruction of our judgments, higher-level as well as lower-level, 
perceptual as well as mnemonic and rational, in terms of appearances, in such a 
way that rational deliverances are construed by him as non-epistemic seemings. If 
correct, the latter strategy could help the Sceptic to effectively deal with the 
charges of self-annihilation and of being hostage to the same epistemological 
views of dogmatic common sense. 
And this brings us to the nub of the question. Granted that the Sceptic can 
lead an active life without judgmental beliefs, why is he so eager to recommend 
such a conformist life deprived of convictions, to propose a participation in the 
ordinary life that falls short of a full identification, and that makes of the 
Pyrrhonist, according to the felicitous expression coined by Terence Penelhum, a 
man in the ordinary world, but not of it,20 one that conforms to, but who does not 
endorse, common practice? 
The stock-in-trade answer that the Pyrrhonian gives to this question is that, 
while the Sceptics are “disturbed by things which are forced upon them,”21 
ordinary people are affected “by two sets of circumstances:”22 by the feelings they 
suffer, and by the beliefs that, attending to them, plague their minds as well as 
their bodies. It is interesting to note that, in a characteristic twist of the doctrines 
of the Stoa,23 Sextus, instead of promising to the philosophically enlightened the 
                                                                
19 Katja Maria Vogt, “Scepticism and Action,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ancient 
Scepticism, ed. Richard Bett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 171. 
20 See Terence Penelhum, “Skepticism and Fideism,” in The Skeptical Tradition, ed. Myles 
Burnyeat (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), 292.  
21 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines, 29. 
22 Ibid., 30. 
23 As Katja Maria Vogt forcefully argues, it is a common feature of Ancient Pyrrhonists to turn 
fundamental aspects of the Stoic’s theory upside down, endorsing notions that would be 
nonsensical for the Stoic (forced assent, undogmatic belief, moderate ataraxia…), and so 
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ideal of imperturbability, talks about “tranquillity in matters of opinion and 
moderation of feeling in matters forced upon us.”24 This means that the Pyrrhonist 
cannot help, say, feeling a physical pain or suffering a psychological disturbance. 
But that it is up to him to get rid of those beliefs that, dilating the power of the 
imagination and suggesting a metaphysical dimension working in the world of 
individual misfortune, compound our suffering. 
In my opinion, what the Pyrrhonians seem to have in mind when talking 
about beliefs that double our troubles are phenomena related to moral guilt, such 
as interpreting misfortune and physical discomfort as the results of deeds 
ascribable to the free agency of the individual, and to a (possible) psychological 
disintegration due to the conflict between whatever feelings arise in the individual 
from demands of his body, and the judgments of value that he is inclined to make 
on reflection. In this regard, it is not very difficult to appreciate how, looking 
through the eyes of the Pyrrhonist, the Stoic sage turns from being all in one piece 
to illustrate an unbridgeable divorce between animal pain and the rational 
prescription (that he endorses) of making of all happenings his own will. By the 
lights of the Sceptic, this conflict cannot be solved, but dissolved: his therapy is 
thus a cure of passivity that avoids disintegration at the cost of dispensing with 
any sort of rational judgment and rational agency. 
Notice, however, that the Pyrrhonian extends the phenomenon of 
psychological disintegration from paradigm cases of metaphysical dissociation to 
any kind of reflective dissociation whatsoever, so that the borderline between 
judgmental beliefs and passive approvals is not, on his view, tantamount to the 
frontier separating philosophical inquiry and common sense. This means that the 
Sceptic is not only worried about metaphysical afflictions, and that his therapy 
equally applies to practical judgments innocent of theorizing.  
What practical judgments bring to the open is epistemic regret, a sort of 
disturbance whose source is the disparity between our thoughts and their results, 
the indeterminate character of our epistemic achievements, which, no matter how 
well we comply with rational norms of justification, can never be secured by 
reflection. Torn apart by normative commands that oblige him to be fully 
responsible for his beliefs (and fully creditable for their success) and by his 
awareness of how epistemic luck permeates all his performances, the agent 
fluctuates between an abstention from action that results from his inability to 
reach a definite conclusion, and an epistemic remorse that, whether his 
                                                                                                                                       
mocking the high ideals and the unrestricted standards of knowledge and wisdom advanced by 
their opponents (see Vogt, “Scepticism and Action,” 174-175).   
24 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines, 25. 
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performances are successful or not, stems from his conviction that, wanting 
absolute certainty, all our beliefs (and all our actions) are irresponsible, that acting 
is never acting well enough. Eradicating judgments and dispensing with rational 
imperatives, the Pyrrhonian unshackles his practice from that double jeopardy, 
gaining peace while catching his opponents in their own net of irresolution and 
inactivity. For the Pyrrhonian, to be active is incompatible with performing 
actions regulated by rational desiderata and reflective standards. Insofar as 
reflection prevents action, and that activity is a natural process that does not 
require of a monitoring subject, the Pyrrhonian turns the paralysis charge against 
his opponents. For him, action (practice within a natural and cultural form of life) 
takes care of itself.  
However, passivity is not only the end of the Pyrrhonian’s toils. It is also 
constitutive of the means he employs to reach happiness. After all, suspension of 
judgment is not the result of a normative use of reason and of free reflection, but a 
passive experience that is the product of the equipollence of arguments. 
Understood as seemings, the deliverances of reasoning are deprived of their 
epistemic status. The Pyrrhonian is thus able to effectively confront the charge of 
becoming an agent in order to get rid of agency, or, in other words, of endorsing 
in his methodological moment the same commitments whose abolishment gives 
its meaning to the method itself. It is not a surprise that, in an image that came to 
be part of philosophical common lore, Sextus compared sceptical arguments with a 
ladder that he “overturns with his foot”25 once his thesis has been established, and 
that for the Sceptic there was no problem in engaging in philosophy to get rid of 
philosophy. 
The problem is that, if we take the Pyrrhonist at his word, his project of 
externalizing belief comes to be a project of complete externalization, by which 
the Sceptic detaches himself from his animal as well as from his rational nature. At 
the very least, this makes it quite difficult to see how to ascribe to him any 
(intellectual or ethical) virtue, when there is no ego to which attribute it, or when 
that ego shrinks to the measure of a metaphysical point, or how to apply to him 
basic norms of assertion such as sincerity, when he does not believe what he says 
and when he represents ‘his’ actions as the actions of somebody else, acting as the 
spokesman of ‘his’ impulses, ‘his’ education or ‘his’ society, and so as always 
asserting as “the occupier of a role.”26  
                                                                
25 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, ed. Richard Bett (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 481. 
26 Ernest Sosa, Knowing Full Well (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011), 47. 
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It seems that, after all, sceptical humility is not a genuine variety of 
intellectual humility, and that the Pyrrhonist offers as a bona fide product 
something that is closer to the vice of abjection than to the virtue of humility. 
This is a symptom that something was terribly wrong in the very principles of the 
Sceptic’s approach to epistemology. 
3. Where the Pyrrhonist Goes Wrong  
The first thing that I want to observe is that the very intellectual virtue with 
which the Sceptic differentiates his persuasion, the openmindedness proper of a 
serious and neutral enquirer,27 is empty of content, and so that it is nothing else 
than a political gesture to make his position attractive. 
At the opening of the Outlines of Scepticism, Sextus distinguishes himself 
from positive dogmatists that “have said that they have discovered the truth”28 and 
from Academics that “have asserted that it cannot be apprehended,”29 claiming 
that Pyrrhonians are still searching for the truth. However, when coming to 
define scepticism, he describes it as a dialectical ability “to set out oppositions 
among things”30 whose leading motivation is suspension of assent, as an 
argumentative expertise (or virtue) intrinsically directed, not to the truth, but to 
avoid belief and commitment.  
This means that the sceptical inquiry is not an open investigation that 
attempts to discover the truth where the subject endeavours to get it right on 
whether p, but a policy with a view to tranquility, and so that it is a discernible 
exercise in wishful thinking where the Sceptic’s pragmatic motivation constantly 
threatens to override relevant evidence. In my view, the frame of mind required 
to pursue the truth and the Pyrrhonian frame of mind are incompatible, in such a 
way that, paraphrasing Sosa, the Pyrrhonist’s dominant desire removes both his 
epistemic competence and his openmindedness,31 if only because of the fact that, 
as Descartes perfectly saw, this pragmatic desire makes of the Sceptic’s intellectual 
horizon something miserably close, blinding him to a more radical doubt 
supported by the very materials he uses, and to the possibility of, pushing sceptical 
arguments to their very limits, reaching certainties able to refute scepticism. 
Pragmatic considerations thus prevented the Pyrrhonians from taking their 
scepticism seriously enough. It was on Descartes to derive from this “very 
                                                                
27 Note that ‘Sceptic’ and ‘enquirer’ are cognate words in Greek. 
28 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines, 2. 
29 Ibid., 2. 
30 Ibid., 8. 
31 See Sosa, Knowing Full Well, 29. 
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seriousness”32 those new elements that mark the border between Ancient and 
Modern philosophy. 
All this, however, might apparently co-exist with a positive evaluation of 
sceptical arguments and conclusions as used within a non-Pyrrhonian framework 
where the search for truth is relevant. I will make three remarks in answer to this 
possibility. 
In the first place, the Pyrrhonian seems guilty of equivocation on the notion 
of appearance, operating with two incompatible concepts: a restricted notion that, 
impervious to reasons and under no control by the rational agent, it is conceived 
on the model of sensations, and an extended notion that applies to rational 
operations and deliverances, covering as seemings the whole of our deliberative 
and personal processes. This equivocation points to a general and systematic 
confusion between reasons and causes, judgments and sensations, compulsions 
operative at a sub-personal level and rational considerations that impel assent. 
We must observe firstly that, by the Pyrrhonist’s lights, approvals are akin 
to automatic responses to changes in the environment, that they are understood as 
dispositions triggered by events causally related to our sensorial equipment.33 
However, they are not mere dispositions to act (behavioural dispositions), but 
dispositions to act intrinsically coupled to phenomenal inclinations. Notice, in this 
sense, the difference between how the sun appears to me and the judgment, based 
on the reports of my sight, as of the small size of the sun.34 The important point is 
that astronomical reflections are able to change our judgments about the size and 
the distance of the sun, but that they are incapable to vary appearances. This is 
what the Pyrrhonian means when saying that appearances are impervious to 
reasons, and what justifies his drawing such an impenetrable border between 
approvals (as sensations of sorts) and rational beliefs. The same claim could be 
paraphrased by saying that for the Pyrrhonians error is a property of judgments, 
                                                                
32 Myles Burnyeat, “Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed,” 
The Philosophical Review 91, 1 (1982): 39. 
33 This model applies to approvals responsive to the “guidance of nature,” where the forced 
nature of seemings is both salient and paradigmatic. This does not exclude, however, adaptation 
and learning, whether as biological organisms or as social beings responsive to cultural inputs. 
The important points are that, inasmuch as it is not in our power to alter hard-wired 
appearances, they are instrumental to the Sceptic’s purpose, and that, whether social or natural, 
acquired or innate, approvals are understood by the Pyrrhonians in terms of blind causality, and 
not in terms of justification and rational evaluation.   
34 See Descartes, “Meditations,” 27. 
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and that, sensations being non-epistemic, they are not guilty of errors commonly 
attributed to them.35 
Apart from the curious dissimilarity between natural approvals and 
seemings that result from argumentation, the trouble with the previous account is 
that the logical subjects of appearance-statements are everyday objects, and so that 
approvals refer to propositions made out of conceptual contents resulting from the 
operation of the intellectual and recognitional capabilities of the individual. That 
is a far cry from passive sensations, so that the Pyrrhonian seems trapped in a 
dilemma between abandoning his model, and so relocating approvals in the space 
of reasons, and sticking to it, at the cost of committing himself to opacity and of 
depriving his actions of any natural guidance whatsoever.36 In my opinion, the 
most sensible option for the Sceptic would be to conceive of human sense 
perception as including two discrete capabilities working in tandem: sensory 
awareness as well as understanding, and so to incorporate judgments (whether 
explicit and reflective or embedded from early childhood in our cognitive 
dispositions) within our natural equipment. On this reading, the pressure on the 
Sceptic is multiplied. He not only has to explain in which sense rational 
deliverances are seemings, but he also has to extend that explanation to 
approvals.37 
                                                                
35 This is common ground for Descartes and the Pyrrhonists. Contrary to some interpretations, 
Descartes understood sensory misrepresentation in terms of harsh judgments or misleading 
conceptions that “we form without any reflection in our early childhood” [René Descartes, 
“Objections and Replies,” in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume II, ed. John 
Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984), 295] and that we are able to correct. 
36 The point is that “It appears to me as if the sun is small” is not a faithful report of the contents 
of the sensation, but an interpretation of those contents that presupposes the operation of highly 
sophisticated evaluative and recognitional powers.  
37 The Pyrrhonian could easily reply to the above objection by pointing out that he accepts that 
our recognitional powers subserve the formation of beliefs about, for instance, the colours 
things look, but that both our intellectual sensitivities and the presentations resulting from their 
operations are non-doxastic. In this sense, he would be able to segregate judgments from 
approvals, the latter being forced and undogmatic assents where the agent, instead of 
committing himself to the belief that, say, he is holding a dagger, simply claims that he is having 
an experience as if a dagger were in his hands, acting accordingly. The point is that the 
Pyrrhonian can easily incorporate intellectual powers to his model without thus incorporating 
judgments, so that he can coherently propose a general suspension of judgment without 
suspending action. Seemings are prior to and independent of judgments. They are enough to 
guide common practice. 
I do not dispute that presentations [or, borrowing from Sosa, “propositional experience” (Sosa, 
Knowing Full Well, 74-78)] are independent of judgments. What I dispute to the Sceptic is that 
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The only way for the Pyrrhonian to do it is, in my view, by appealing to the 
operative norms of our cognitive form of life, and by consequently exploiting and 
iterating the gap between those norms and our first-order judgments, in such a 
way that our practices, as well as the norms regulating them, fall short of their 
own normative dimension.  
The point of that strategy would be to secure that a higher-order 
endorsement of our beliefs could never be obtained. In this sense, what the Sceptic 
would be putting in question is that we could integrate the contents of our claims 
and the rules governing them into the very rational perspective that those norms 
and claims reclaim. On this reading, when saying that all our judgments are 
seemings, the Sceptic, while also trying to recapture something of the original 
flavour of forced and passive sensations (after all, rational seemings are imposed on 
us by the compelling character of arguments), confines himself to describe his 
own reflective lack of position, qualifying (on reflection) his expressions of 
approval. His sceptical attitude would thus be located on the meta-reflective 
order, as expressing the mismatch between the results of pure reflection and the 
rational principles guiding action. 
There is much to say about this interpretation of Ancient scepticism, if only 
because it is helpful to explain how Descartes could make a better use of some of 
the aspects of the ‘reheated cabbage’ of Pyrrhonism to create a brand-new variety 
                                                                                                                                       
presentations are non-doxastic, and so that there is a distinction between approvals and 
judgments. This point can be substantiated by, at least, two considerations: (i) The Pyrrhonian 
confuses approvals to seemings with approvals understood as seemings, modelling the difference 
between approvals and judgments on the distinction between appearance and reality. This error 
blinds him to the fact that any kind of approval, whether weak or strong, is responsive to 
reasons, and so that the hold of a presentation can be broken (or minimized) and that, since one 
acts according to his experience as of a dagger only as far as one thinks that such an experience 
is veridical, approvals that guide action are always dogmatic (approvals to the likely truth of p). 
The point is that, instead of postulating two kinds of assent, one should say that there is only 
one kind, but that there are several degrees of assent according to probability. It is true that 
some ‘beliefs’ are so embedded that it is psychologically impossible to suspend assent on them, 
but this means neither that we are forced to endorsing them fully nor that their attraction is a 
non-rational one. (ii) Making compulsive dispositions of approvals, the Sceptic seems forced to 
describe the ordinary person’s endorsements of first-order claims as not involving meta-
epistemic commitments to a strong conception of truth, namely, as closely related to the 
sceptical approval to appearances. Apart from being highly controversial (compare, for instance, 
with the relativist’s claim that common sense assertions are epistemically neutral), this claim 
obliges the Pyrrhonian to reject his own picture of common sense as plagued by dogmatism, and 
so to offer his therapy only to philosophers. On this view, it is far from clear where the roots of 
judgmental attitudes lie, and also, if those attitudes are unnatural or artificial, how this latter 
claim could be supported. 
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of scepticism. However, this should not blind us to the fact that it is far from 
convincing.  
On the one hand, let us observe that, however much it fits with some 
particular trends within Pyrrhonism, this reading is deeply uncongenial to its 
main tenets. The Pyrrhonian does not distinguish between higher-order 
judgments and judgments tout court, a point that suggests that, when saying that 
rational judgments are seemings, he is not meaning that they are seemings in a 
derivative sense, as the result of the philosophical discovery that, reason being 
incapable of self-validation, our first-order judgments lack an objective status. This 
point is further substantiated by the Pyrrhonian insistence on locating epistemic 
disturbance on the first order, and consequently by the kind of therapy that he 
offers, one that, instead of ridding us of epistemological concerns, attempts to 
eradicate our natural judgments. 
On the other hand, consider the discontinuity between theoretical and 
normative scepticism, between the norm of certainty that prevents us from having 
a secured knowledge and the variety of the Principle of Underdetermination38 to 
which the Pyrrhonian appeals in all his procedures.  
As the example of the late Academics makes clear,39 one could consistently 
claim that high-order knowledge is unattainable, and yet make rational judgments 
according to probabilities and guide practice by a doxastic norm, so rejecting 
suspension of assent as the rational attitude to take for many empirical 
propositions. This is why the normative scepticism endorsed by the Pyrrhonians 
needs a perfect equivalence between judgments in order to suspend commitment. 
The trouble is that the Pyrrhonist is torn between a theoretical scepticism that 
could easily make sense of why rational deliverances are seemings, but which is 
compatible with rational belief, and a normative scepticism that abolishes the 
rational attraction of seemings (as it were, its very force) at the cost of inactivity. 
As a conclusion, one could say that, since the attraction of seemings is at least in 
part intellectual, an unmitigated scepticism seriously compromises active life. In 
any case, there is no entailment from the rejection of knowledge to a general 
suspension of assent such that all our beliefs would be equally unjustified. 
But, in the second place, it is quite important to notice that, even if it is true 
that knowledge and rational belief stand or fall together, this is a claim that the 
very materials with which the Pyrrhonist deals prevent him from making.  
                                                                
38 According to the formulation provided by Duncan Pritchard, this principle states that if S 
knows that p and q describes an incompatible scenario, and yet S lacks a rational basis for 
preferring p over q, then S lacks knowledge that p (see Pritchard, Epistemic Angst, 30).  
39 See Vogt, “Scepticism and Action,” 167-171. 
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Pyrrhonism is by its own nature a species of empirical scepticism, one that, 
according to the apt expression coined by Robert Fogelin, attempts to raise radical 
and unlimited doubts by the only means of “checkable but unchecked defeaters.”40 
On the one hand, this procedural limitation blinds the Pyrrhonian to the 
hierarchical structure of our beliefs, preventing him from appreciating the 
normative role played by hinges “of the form of empirical propositions,”41 and 
raising justified concerns about the prospects of supporting by those means a sort 
of scepticism at least as radical as the Cartesian one. On the other hand, it seems 
that, deprived of global scenarios, the Pyrrhonist is unable to argue for the 
reduction of any probability, however high, to nothing.42 My point is that, 
inasmuch as they put in question our basic background assumptions, only global 
scenarios are candidates to suspend degrees of probability and to debase any 
judgment to the same level of equality—as equally unjustified—, and so that only 
Cartesian scepticism could in principle be able to bridge the gap between 
theoretical and normative scepticism. 
This does not mean, however, that the aforementioned gap is, under closer 
scrutiny, bridgeable. As Descartes perfectly saw, global scenarios being governed 
by the same laws of probability ruling all our rational judgments, they are far-
fetched, hyperbolical and “metaphysical”43 possibilities, possibilities whose very 
implausibility is not up to cancel the fact that many empirical claims are “highly 
probable opinions.”44 Contrary to Hume, Descartes did not think that iteration and 
epistemic ascent to the second order could diminish the probability of our first-
order judgments, if only because global scenarios act as regress stoppers and are 
used by Descartes, not as empirical defeaters that decrease the probability of any 
item whatsoever within the system, but as metaphysical narratives that, 
                                                                
40 Robert Fogelin, Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 192. 
41 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, § 401. 
42 Compare with the fiasco made by Hume when, in the Treatise, he attempted to reduce by 
empirical considerations all knowledge to probabilities, and all probabilities to nothing at all. 
43 Descartes, “Meditations,” 25. 
44 Ibid., 15. This explains why Descartes has to ‘feign’ that all his beliefs are false, deceiving 
himself about their epistemic weight. Given the context and the objectives of Descartes’ project 
of acquiring scientia and of erecting the building of science on sound grounds, it is perfectly 
understandable his demanding policy of “pretending for a time that these former opinions are 
utterly false and imaginary.” (Ibid., 15)  
For an illuminating analysis of Descartes’ epistemological policy, see Sosa, Judgment and 
Agency, 237-239. 
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undermining the metaphysical certainty of all our beliefs, leave moral and 
psychological certainty unscathed. 
Descartes’ point is very subtle. By ingeniously using a strategy analogous to 
the Pyrrhonian ladder, he manages to show how global scenarios are not on the 
same spectrum as defeaters that, when making a cognitive claim, one did not 
consider, and so how, contrary to the appearances, they carry (in a sense of 
‘probability’ that is internal to the system) no probabilistic weight at all, not even 
one only enough to make of a maximally probable belief a highly (but not 
maximally) probable belief.  
Take, for example, a paradigmatic perceptual belief, one that could not be 
doubted by appealing to doppelgängers. It is reasonable to think that, insofar as a 
global scenario H incompatible with the truth of a paradigmatic belief that p is 
conceivable, this very fact diminishes, however slightly, the degree of probability 
of p. The problem is that, the belief that p being paradigmatic, it has to stand fast 
for our rational system not to collapse. This means that, reason being non-
optional, and p being constitutively attached to our rational system, p’s moral 
certainty is unassailable. One could say that, however possible, global scenarios are 
unable to shake, even slightly, our first-order rational conviction, or, in other 
words, that the operations of our rational system are insulated from global 
hypotheses.  
Following the preceding view, for Descartes the function played by global 
scenarios is not that of reducing our conviction, but of helping us to acquire a 
transcendental and higher-order position from which we could see as possible 
how the power of reason is so external and compulsive as the power of natural 
compulsions, so stripping moral certainties, not of their rational conviction, but of 
a normative dimension that gives them an authority higher than intra-rational 
authority. Descartes’ point is that metaphysical uncertainty is compatible with 
moral or intra-rational certainty, and that, scepticism being metaphysical or 
transcendental, global scenarios are rational only in the marginal sense of being 
possible interpretations of the ultimate character of our world as a whole, but not 
in the sense of being relevant alternatives within that world.  
In short, Descartes considers sceptical scenarios like a ladder that leads to a 
whole reinterpretation of their own meaning and significance. They leave things 
as they were before, while overturning our higher-order way of looking at them. 
The point is that, whether our reason can ultimately be validated or not, rational 
judgments are not comparable with blind impulses. This is why Descartes is 
creditable for isolating the norm of metaphysical certainty from the norms that 
govern rational performances, the quest for invulnerable knowledge from the 
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investigation of rational action. Descartes improved on the procedures of 
traditional scepticism. He also relocated scepticism on the second order. It is this 
latter aspect that makes it possible to combine empirical fallibilism with a project 
of rationally integrating hinges, to wit, principles of judgment.   
And observe, lastly, that the Pyrrhonian cannot even secure a complete 
detachment from all his commitments, that, inasmuch as sooner or later he is 
doomed to reach a point where his policy of rejection cannot be obeyed,45 or 
where the falsification thesis, namely, the possibility of a radical discrepancy 
between how things really are and what they seem to be, no longer make sense, or 
where there is such a tight alignment between the understanding and the will that 
there is no cue to move the will to the opposite direction, he is not going to attain 
the complete externalization that, foreshadowing the libertarian conception of 
freedom, he conceives as the only means to preserve his free and uncommitted 
attitude. 
The interesting thing is that such points where the hold of unmitigated 
scepticism is broken are always operations of intuitive reason, of an intellectual 
power that sceptical meditations help us to recognize, to purify, and to develop, 
and that, unexternalizable, it presents itself, not as an external and coercive force 
acting on the passive subject, but as a power whose deliverances are imposed upon 
the agent by himself. When yielding to intuitive reason the subject is yielding to 
his own power, in such a way that a perfect certainty is the same as a perfect 
liberty. This means that absent a rational integration of the principles of judgment, 
the latter are, in a certain sense, external. This is why arational approaches to 
hinges are, in my view, unable to get rid of the bewitchment of scepticism, and so 
why they are plagued by the same anxieties that, against his best intentions, assail 
the Sceptic. To be sure, these are philosophical anxieties, disquietudes of the meta-
reflective mind that are (usually) unable to divorce the ordinary person from his 
life. Nonetheless, they provoke a feeling of rational irresponsibility that, pointing 
to a possible discrepancy between Mind and World and between intuitive reason 
and truth, deprives the mind of its own fulfilment. 
The curious thing about the Pyrrhonians is that they made possible against 
their will the discovery of the rational agent, of a rational animal that, however 
limited in his understanding, is lord of his inner world and stands above the 
impulses of mere feeling.  The very fact that they failed to withdraw themselves 
fully from the human and rational atmosphere about them, and that their 
uneasiness was so clearly betrayed by their desperate clinging to a mechanical 
                                                                
45 For an interpretation of Descartes’ certainties in terms of a failure to act in accordance with 
his policy of global rejection of beliefs, see Sosa, Judgment and Agency, 244. 
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dialectic, smoothed the path to a model of rational guidance where the norm of 
judging to the best and the virtue of intellectual humility are logically 
interrelated: the Cartesian model. 
4. The Position of Intellectual Humility in Descartes’ Virtue Epistemology 
For a start, let us observe that the ‘state of prejudice’ that is the target of the 
Cartesian therapy46 is described by Descartes as involving an implicit epistemology 
rooted in several vices, at once intellectual and ethical: (i) a corrupted use of 
reason that confuses the deliverances of the imagination with the correct 
functioning of our rational power; (ii) the habit of thinking of deep-rooted 
opinions as if they were invulnerable principles; (iii) a general blindness to 
attitudes and beliefs that are subject to control by our wills, and, consequently, a 
common inclination to take our senses as well as our passions at face value, as 
evaluations that conform either to the object’s true nature or to its true worth, so 
thinking that one cannot help to believe or to act as one feels impelled to do, and 
that intellectual and ethical self-restraint are either worthless or accessory to our 
impulses; and (iv) the conviction that certainty lies in the senses, a conviction that 
for Descartes is salient in explaining the disputes involving irreconcilable 
differences between the Pyrrhonians and their adversaries,47 and that, inasmuch as 
it leads to intellectual paralysis, Descartes is eager to expunge.48 
                                                                
46 That the Meditations are therapeutical exercises that require of the reader to reproduce in foro 
interno the same processes and experiences ‘lived’ by the Meditator, in such a way that his mind 
is completely engaged by the subject matter he considers and that he “make(s) the thing his own 
and understand(s) it just as perfectly as if he had discovered it by himself” (Descartes, 
“Objections and Replies,”110), and whose objective is, by means of changing habits as well as 
opinions, to gain enlightenment, is a point substantiated by Descartes’ favouring of the 
analytical method of exposition, and by his continual appeals, not only to the understanding, 
but also to the will of his readers. If involved in this process, the readers pass through a 
maieutical and transformative discipline whose result is a new birth, at once a free and active 
choice and a passive experience. For an analysis of the Cartesian therapy, see Mike Marlies, 
“Doubt, Reason, and Cartesian Therapy,” in Descartes. Critical and Interpretative Essays, ed. 
Michael K. Hooker (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 87-113. 
See also David Cunning, Argument and Persuasion in Descartes’ Meditations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 14-43.     
47 See René Descartes, “Principles of Philosophy,” in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 
Volume I, ed. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), 182. 
48 Descartes describes himself as “the first philosopher ever to overturn the doubts of the 
sceptics.” (Descartes, “Objections and Replies,” 376) He grounds this claim in his contribution to 
making explicit the above category mistake, and thus to expose the overrated epistemological 
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That certainty lies solely in the understanding, namely, that only clear and 
distinct perceptions of the intellect count as examples of a knowledge invulnerable 
to metaphysical doubt, it is not only the positive principle that permits Descartes 
to stop radical scepticism, but also a principle of demarcation that settles the 
border between the objects proper to metaphysical certainty and judgments that 
are by their own nature defeasible. As textual evidence internal to Descartes’ 
corpus shows, the former constitute a logical framework that is the intentional 
object of pure understanding, a set of contentful norms that govern, constrain, and 
make it possible the understanding of particular items, and whose objects are 
constituted by conceptual webs of necessary and logically interrelated aspects that 
the mind pulls from within itself and whose validity is independent of what 
empirical facts obtain and of the amount and the quality of the information 
accessible to the epistemic subject.  
Descartes’ point is that certainty is unattainable beyond this framework, so 
that the norm of certainty that rules the project of securing and integrating the 
foundations of knowledge does not apply to empirical judgments that neither can 
be deduced from first principles nor can be governed by any other rule but the 
law of plausibility.49 For Descartes, by the same process through which we acquire 
metaphysical certainty, we become aware of the limits of infallible knowledge. 
One thus acquires clear and distinct perceptions only against a background of 
objects whose conception is partial, confused, obscure, and corrigible. 
This means that the perfect fitting between the light of the intellect and the 
inclination of the will which characterizes certainty, and, consequently, that 
Descartes’ recommendation, in Meditation Four, for avoiding error, namely, to 
suspend judgment whenever one does not perceive the truth with clarity and 
distinctness,50 are, respectively, mental states and epistemic rules operative solely 
within the context of a meditative reflection where the mind is conceived by itself 
and where practical concerns are fully suspended, and so that they do not conform 
                                                                                                                                       
status commonly conferred to the senses, and to break the hold of the empirical tradition that is 
the ground of possibility for scepticism. 
49 “But most of our desires extend to matters which do not depend wholly on us or wholly on 
others, and we must therefore take care to pick out just what depends only on us, so as to limit 
our desire to that alone. As for the rest, although we must consider their outcome to be wholly 
fated and immutable, so as to prevent our desire from occupying itself with them, yet we must 
not fail to consider the reasons which make them more or less predictable, so as to use these 
reasons in governing our actions. [Our emphasis]” René Descartes, “The Passions of the Soul, in 
The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume I, ed. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and 
Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 380. 
50 See Descartes, “Meditations,” 41. 
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with the possibilities accessible for an ego substantially united to his body that has 
to act in order to live, to judge in order to act, and to take decisions either at the 
brink of the moment or on the basis of inconclusive or unreliable information.  
Notice, however, that such a limitation does not entail that similar, if less 
stringent, rational rules could not guide our actions, and thus that we are forcibly 
caught in a dilemma between (a) being true to our rational nature at the cost of 
inactivity (on Descartes’ reading of Pyrrhonism, that is the result of the Sceptic’s 
mistake of searching for certainty in the realm of the senses, and, consequently, of 
making of the norm of certainty the rule governing empirical beliefs)51, and (b) 
being false to our rational nature, yielding to the power of the passions and to the 
way they make things to appear, in order to be active. The empirical analogue of 
invulnerable certainty is responsible judgment, namely, a judgment from which, 
since it is supported by evidence that speaks to its likely truth, the agent takes at 
once care and responsibility (as his own). The empirical analogue for avoiding 
error is judging to the best of our powers in accordance with the circumstances 
(and the limits imposed by them), and knowing full well that, because luck 
permeates all our judgments, our thoughts depend on us, but their ends are not 
ours. 
Let us observe that for Descartes the epistemic (and opposed) vices of 
prevention and precipitation play an important part in the diagnosis of the sources 
of cognitive disintegration, as this malady presents itself in practical reasoning. 
Contrary to the Pyrrhonians, who, bewitched by the opinion that the norm of 
certainty rules our empirical beliefs, thought of the agent as swinging between 
inactivity and epistemic remorse, and saw as the unique source of his fluctuating 
condition the natural drive to judgmental beliefs that always fall short of their 
supposed norm, Descartes describes two different sources for the opposite states of 
irresolution and epistemic repentance.52  
                                                                
51 Descartes, “Principles of Philosophy,” 182. Descartes’s philosophical instincts are sound on 
this point. The Stoics’ dogmatic empiricism acted as the target of Academic and Pyrrhonian 
arguments, embroiling the latter in the same web of implicit commitments and general 
assumptions of their opponents. This is an example of a first-order disagreement made possible 
by a meta-order agreement. 
52 Descartes distinguishes between remorse and repentance. The former being “a kind of sadness 
which results from our doubting that something we are doing, or have done, is good” (Descartes, 
“Passions,” 392), it presupposes doubt. Remorse becomes repentance once we are certain of 
having acted wrongly. Notice that repentance is the intellectual emotion opposite to self-
satisfaction, a state of the mind characteristic of the generous man that Descartes considers the 
supreme good, and that he equates to peace of mind and tranquility. 
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Irresolution is, according to Descartes, “a kind of anxiety”53 that results 
“from too great a desire to do well” and “from a weakness of the intellect, which 
contains only a lot of confused notions, and none that are clear and distinct.”54 The 
interesting point about the previous diagnosis is that, although Descartes agrees 
with the Pyrrhonians in seeing the desire of achieving conclusive arguments and a 
perfect certainty as the source of irresolution, he segregates that desire, which 
stems from the intellectual error of thinking that certainty lies in the senses (this 
is why Descartes emphasizes the role played by clear and distinct perceptions to 
avoid irresolution: recognizing them involves recognizing at once the limits of 
metaphysical certainty), from our duty as reflective agents, a duty that is fulfilled 
“when we do what we judge to be best, even though our judgment may perhaps be 
a very bad one.”55  
This account makes it possible for Descartes: (i) to conceive irresolution as a 
tragedy of unenlightened reflection to which philosophers are especially prone, 
but that, inasmuch as it is not coupled to the natural impulse to judge, afflicts 
neither common man nor common nature; (ii) to propose as its remedy the habit 
“to form certain and determinate judgments regarding everything that comes 
before us,”56 that is to say, a prescription that, unlike the Pyrrhonian one, is both 
viable and stimulating; and, finally, (iii) to shed light on epistemic remorse in 
terms of a common phenomenon that, instead of resulting from the conflict 
between the high standards allegedly operative in practical judgment and the 
imperatives of action (a conflict that could be understood only by a trained 
epistemologist enthralled by the ideal of indefeasible empirical knowledge), it 
results from the discord between how we act and how we should act, between our 
rational duty and our failing to comply with it.  
In short, for Descartes, while irresolution is the product of intellectual 
delusions, epistemic regret is the result of qualms that are too real and ordinary for 
comfort, qualms produced by the clash between our epistemic natural conscience 
and our unreflective behaviour. Contrary to the Pyrrhonians’ view, repentance is 
not for Descartes a disturbance that assails the agent, but an anxiety that plagues 
the mind of those whose action has not been guided by proper rational 
considerations, however minimal and impaired by external circumstances such as 
                                                                                                                                       
The previous distinction is not, however, relevant for our purposes. We will refer indistinctly to 
both emotions. 
53 Descartes, “Passions,” 390. 
54 Ibid., 390-391. 
55 Ibid., 391. 
56 Ibid., 391. 
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urgency, lack of accessible information or unfriendly scenarios.57 By Descartes’ 
lights, instead of appeasing anxiety, the Pyrrhonian cure of passivity would 
severely intensify it. Our nature being rational, the recommendation for passive 
action and passive belief would amount to the proposal of being false to ourselves. 
This is why for Descartes the intellectual virtue of generosity—that in his 
technical parlance stands for openmindedness—is the supreme virtue to which we 
can aspire. 
Generosity is the human capacity of restraining the power of the passions, 
and of acquiring a reflective and more objective stance from which to weight the 
different factors of a situation, and, eventually, to act, not impelled by our 
feelings, but out of a deliberative process. Let us observe, however, that, far from 
being a later-day follower of the Stoics, Descartes is fully aware that the passions 
are an essential ingredient for a fulfilled human life, if only because, directing the 
subject’s attention at the morally important features of a situation and helping to 
strengthen one’s moral belief, they are the emotional counterparts of evaluative 
judgments, the moorings that make the integration of mind and body possible and 
that allow the soul to establish unions with the world (which include unions with 
the agent’s beliefs and actions).58 The trouble with the passions is that, inasmuch 
as they tend to overestimate or to underrate the significance of things, they have 
to be monitored and endorsed by the understanding. Failing this rational control, 
which is far from being an eradication of the passions, we are liable to practical 
error and, what is most important, to epistemic regret.  
                                                                
57 “I think also that there is nothing to repent of when we have done what we judged best at the 
time when we had to decide to act, even though later, thinking it over at our leisure, we judge 
that we made a mistake. There would be more ground for repentance if we had acted against 
our conscience, even though we realized afterwards that we had done better than we thought. 
For we are responsible only for our thoughts, and it does not belong to human nature to be 
omniscient, or always to judge as well on the spur of the moment as when there is plenty of 
time to deliberate.” René Descartes, “The Correspondence,” in The Philosophical Writings of 
Descartes, Volume III, ed. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony 
Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 269. 
58 Following some cues provided by Byron Williston [see Byron Williston, “The Cartesian Sage 
and the Problem of Evil,” in Passion and Virtue in Descartes, eds. Byron Williston and André 
Gombay (New York: Humanity Books, 2003), 310-311], I would say that for Descartes passions 
are not spontaneous representations of value that justify evaluative beliefs. On the contrary, the 
very fact that they are epistemically assessable suggests that they are expressions elicited and 
justified either by judgments of value or by experiences of pain, discomfort, and so on. This 
means that for Descartes passions are highly responsive to beliefs and at least partially under the 
control of rational considerations. In many cases, passions are resistant to rational 
considerations. But this does not entail that, unlike sensations, they are invulnerable to them.   
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Consider this latter aspect. For Descartes, no matter how successful our 
unreflective and passionate actions are, and insofar as we are rationally divorced 
from them, they are the occasion for a disturbance that prevents our full 
integration with our lives and with the world. This means that, by his lights, the 
scruples of our rational nature are the main hindrance to the soul’s union with the 
world and to its own self-contentment as substantially united to the body. For the 
passions to “become a source of joy,”59 they have to be rationally integrated, and so 
they have to occupy their proper and circumscribed position within our rational 
life, in such a way that one could not be blamed (specially by oneself) for the 
failure of one’s performances, and that one could only be praised by the only thing 
that “truly belongs to (one),”60 namely, one’s freedom to dispose one’s volitions. 
Generosity is nothing else than the experience and the exercise of freedom, and 
freedom ultimately is the compliance to our rational duty and the subsequent 
states of virtue and self-esteem. Luck does not separate the agent from himself. 
Compulsive action does so. 
Finally, it is important to notice that Cartesian generosity is intrinsically 
related to the virtues of tolerance and of intellectual humility, and that only the 
humble, open minded and tolerant person is capable to recognize, from his own 
experience of freedom, the rational and free character of other human beings, so 
escaping from a theoretical egoism whose sources are compulsion and practical 
egoism.  
On the one side, the old-fashioned and judgmental virtue of tolerance is 
rooted in the related convictions that, however wrong the opinions of others are, 
our wrongs are “no less serious than those which others may do,”61 and that, 
however right our opinions are, they cannot be forcibly imposed on a rational 
agent with the capacity to judge by himself and to discover freely and by his own 
means where the truth lies.62 Tolerance is thus a virtue rooted in the experience of 
our rational and fallible nature, so that it includes humility and openmindedness. 
On the other side, humility is the proper attitude of an agent that, in order to be 
true to his rational nature, has to judge to the best of his powers, but that, 
                                                                
59 Descartes, “Passions,” 404. 
60 Ibid., 384. 
61 Ibid., 385. 
62 This explains both Descartes’ preference for the analytic method of teaching philosophy and 
his inclination for therapeutical approaches to philosophy. Dealing with rational agents, the role 
of the teacher is not to instruct the philosophically untrained, but to let the disciple’s reason to 
take the part of the instructor. It is common both to Descartes’ and Wittgenstein’s philosophical 
therapies, to stress that, in order to be cured, the sick soul has to freely agree with the diagnosis 
(as a matter of fact, he has to make his own diagnosis).  
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recognizing the limited nature of those powers, has to come to terms with the fact 
that a judgment can be adroit and inaccurate (or accurate only by accident). The 
important point is that for Descartes the exercise of epistemic rationality and 
failure (or good luck) are compatible, and so that freedom and rational agency are 
not cancelled by the results (that do not belong to us) of our beliefs.  
On this view, humility is a constitutive ingredient of generosity, of how it is 
for human beings to be rational.  
Even the blows of an adverse fortune are unable to shake the foundations in 
which our freedom and our self-contentment are secured.63  
Appendix 
I would like to concisely underline some deep similarities between Descartes’ view 
and Sosa’s version of a virtue epistemology: 
(i) For Descartes, as well as for Sosa, the exercise of agency is compatible with 
failure.  
(ii) For both of them, what makes a judgment adroit varies in accordance with 
the circumstances, in such a way that it is not possible to linguistically elucidate 
a set of criteria that could be applied in all the cases, actual as well as possible. In 
this regard, Descartes only points to a subjective criterion—the internal emotion 
of joy64 that always is conjoined to a responsible belief (the subjective feeling that 
one cannot reproach himself for a decision in such and such circumstances)—, 
and to the cultivation of the virtue of prudence. Given the invariant character 
that this feeling has to Descartes and his appeal to the Aristotelian virtue of 
prudential evaluation, the Cartesian response might be endorsed by Sosa. 
                                                                
63 Notice that on this model the virtues of self-contentment and humility are not first-order 
passions that express the value of an object external to the agent, but internal or intellectual 
emotions that represent the right state of the mind, and that can only be acquired by means of 
an intellectual second-order therapy that brings to light the prejudices of untutored common 
sense. The opposite vices of irresolution and dogmatism are rooted in the same false opinion that 
empirical judgments should be indefeasible. Descartes’ procedure counts thus as a rational 
therapy of the same sort as that of the Epicureans and Spinoza. 
64 This “secret joy in (the) innermost soul” (Descartes, “Passions,” 381) is the result of a diligent 
pursuit of epistemic virtue, in such a way that “conscience cannot reproach (us) for ever failing 
to do something (one) judges to be the best.” (Ibid., 382) According to Descartes, this secret joy 
has the power to make of the subject lord of his passions, and to prevent misfortune for 
shattering the self into fragments. In a sense, the agent is able to cope with the blows of fortune 
insofar as there is nothing of which to reproach himself. There is an analogue of this view in 
Spinoza’s acquiescientia in se ipso, and in Harry Frankfurt’s account of the integrated self.   
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(iii) They also agree on the role played by responsibilist intellectual virtues such 
as humility and openmindedness in our cognitive lives. They are instrumental to 
put ourselves “in a position to know,”65 thus being integral “to a purely epistemic 
intellectual ethics.”66 However, and contrary to the role played by cognitive 
virtues such as intuitive reason, memory and perception, they are not 
constitutive of knowledge, to wit, they do not manifest themselves in the 
accuracy of our judgments, helping thus to explain, not how we came to be in a 
position to rationally believe that p, but how that belief is true, and rationally so. 
In this sense, it is necessary to distinguish between the virtues of the responsible 
agent that manifest themselves in his will to judge, and those rational operations 
and capabilities that are exhibited in the judgment’s adroitness, and that, if the 
judgment is correct, relevantly explain why it is a piece of knowledge. Let us 
observe that for Descartes, while openmindedness is a requisite for human 
judgment—it is the virtue of being willingly responsive to the relevant objective 
evidence—, the tasks of collecting and of evaluating the weight of that evidence 
are proper of perception and rationality, in such a way that the latter virtues 
explain, not why a judgment is a judgment, but why it is not, given our 
limitations, a poor judgment. A good will coupled to defective rational powers 
does not make a rational agent. Openmindedness is exhibited in an adroit 
judgment only in a derivative sense, as a policy of non-interference with the 
operations of reason. Instead of explaining how the judgment is adroit, it permits 
us to make adroit judgments.67 What makes of a cook an excellent chef is not his 
will to cook. 
(iv) Finally, it is important to note that, although for Descartes it is in a sense 
true that we always know “by favour of Nature,”68 and that empirical knowledge 
is thus compatible with luck, there is another sense of luck that prevents 
knowledge. As the example of the traveller who reflectively chose, between two 
routes, the safer one, but that was robbed by bandits, shows,69 Descartes not only 
thought that responsible agents cannot be blamed for misfortunes, but that, if, 
given those circumstances, the traveller were fortunate enough to escape 
                                                                
65 Sosa, Judgment and Agency, 45. 
66 Ibid., 45. 
67 For a perfect and detached rational agent the possibility of disintegration (of being false to his 
rational nature) would not exist. His judgments would be adroit without an effort, however 
minimal, on his part. This shows that for certain states personal intellectual virtues are not 
required for rationality and knowledge, and so that in limiting cases they are not constitutive 
(even in a derivative sense) of them.  
68 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, § 505. 
69 Descartes, “Passions,” 380-381. 
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undetected, his success would not amount to a complete competence. This means 
that for Descartes an unfriendly scenario (or a bad situation) prevents adroitness 
to be manifested, and so that in such conditions the agents’ judgment falls short 
of knowledge. Empirical knowledge is thus compatible with having the good 
fortune of being situated in such a way that the circumstances are adequate to a 
proper manifestation of our reflective abilities, but not with a kind of good 
fortune operative within unfriendly situations. Sosa’s analysis of the SSS 
structure of competences renders analogous results.70 
In any case, the affinities between the two philosophers can be intuitively 
apprehended when the following text is compared with the previous remarks on 
Descartes’ conception of the ethical significance of rational agency. Sosa writes: 
Fully apt performance goes beyond the merely successful, the competent, and 
even the reflectively apt. And it is the human, rational animal that can most 
deeply and extensively guide his performances based on the risk involved, in the 
light of the competence at his disposal. That is why reason must lord it over the 
passions, both the appetitive and the emotional. 7172  
                                                                
70 See Sosa, Judgment and Agency, 95-104. 
71 Ibid., 87. 
72 Thanks to Ernest Sosa for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
